A surprising contact on LinkedIn. An offer of employment from a headhunter, probably a female agent, operating from China. The chance to make perhaps £20,000 on the side writing a handful of political analyses for a firm from China peppered with confidential or privileged information. Compensation in cryptocurrency or cash preferred.
It might appear clear, on this telling, that something about this method would be amiss. However, Beijing's influential Ministry of State Security continues to view it worthwhile to use recruitment consultants to try it – leading the domestic spy agency to warn repeatedly about their operations online.
Large-Scale Approaches on Social Media
Last year, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum said Chinese agents were approaching UK citizens on LinkedIn on an extraordinary level, at a rate of ten thousand over the previous two and a half years, attempting to obtain governmental, industrial, military and scientific secrets. But a fresh initiative aimed at politicians and Westminster has led the intelligence service to take further action.
An espionage alert was distributed on this week via the offices of the Commons speaker and his House of Lords equivalent: a brief presentation after the repeated efforts of certain individuals and other operatives to contact Members of Parliament, peers, their assistants, economists, thinktanks – anyone who might provide information.
Security Strategy and Legal Updates
In the curious style of UK security services, there was no publication of the security advice from MI5 or the Home Office. But the agency knew its advisory document would leak once it was emailed out to Westminster. Republishing it in the press assists the general population more easily recognize interactions with a deceptive intent.
The alert has the impact of uncovering more information from within Westminster, though that is not MI5’s primary purpose. The service wants public figures to recognize that just because interactions on LinkedIn are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are completely safe.
Nor is internal security service believed to have been reacting to a particular event in the legislature, although the burst of activity does come after the awkward failure of the prosecution of a ex-assistant an individual and his friend Christopher Berry on a technicality in recent months.
Both individuals had been accused of working for the foreign power – a allegation they rejected – but inability to successfully conclude a prosecution under the since replaced Official Secrets Act led to warnings that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Revised Laws and China's Long-Term Goals
Legislation has now been changed, and the MI5 slide contains a reminder of its successor: “Individuals involved in espionage activity face substantial criminal penalties under the new security law.” It is a criminal offense if somebody engages in conduct that could potentially “significantly help a overseas spy agency”.
A natural inquiry, though, is what Beijing has to gain. A politician who is outside ministerial roles will have limited knowledge of classified material, and an associate of theirs less so. But Beijing is also interested in parliament: for a time, in recent years, the Britain's China policy on issues such as the telecom firm or the human rights situation or genocide was being driven by MPs.
Cultural Differences and Persistent Digital Risks
To a degree there are cultural differences too. Authoritarian governments like China’s utilize information gathering techniques and the size of its intelligence apparatus is vast, employing three hundred thousand individuals. Chris Inglis, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, commented it was sometimes estimated that “the Chinese have more English speakers engaged in this than Western agencies have English speakers”.
The Chinese government is prepared to develop contacts over the long term and sometimes even the agencies have struggled to distinguish between genuine connections and spying. “Beijing has a low threshold for which details is deemed to be of value,” security minister Dan Jarvis informed MPs on Wednesday, but a rapid shift in the political cycle may mean an individual quickly peripheral turning significant.
Another way to consider the continuous efforts at secret information gathering is in the broader framework of the international competition between China and the west at a level under the level of outright war. China has increased its hacking efforts, with the Salt Typhoon infiltration of communications systems in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon compromise of countless internet devices.
Chinese authorities is involved in persistent efforts to find secret informants on UK politics via digital means because it wants to be challenging, to display power and because it has the capability.